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Abstract This analysis comments on Bernstein’s lack of clear understanding of
subjectivity, based on his book, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science,
Hermeneutics, and Praxis. Bernstein limits his interpretation of subjectivity to
thinkers such as Gadamer and Habermas. The authors analyze the ideas of classic
scholars such as Edmund Husserl and Friedrich Nietzsche. Husserl put forward his
notion of transcendental subjectivity and phenomenological ramiﬁcations of the
relationship between subjectivity and objectivity. Nietzsche referred to subjectivity
as ‘‘perspectivism,’’ the inescapable fact that any and all consciousnesses exist in
space and time. Consciousness is fundamentally constituted of cultural, linguistic,
and historical dimensions.
1 Introduction
This paper critiques Bernstein’s view of subjectivity based on his book entitled
Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (1983).
Bernstein tries to widen the context of subjectivity and claims that modern
discussions to the foundations of science and human action must consider thinkers
such as Gadamer and Habermas, who suggested that one cannot reach absolute truth
because truth is subjective. One of the classic scholars referred to in this analysis is
Husserl (1913/1982). Husserl based his notion on transcendental subjectivity. He
established the historical rise and the phenomenological ramiﬁcations of the
relationship between subjectivity and objectivity; more precisely, what he called the
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Another classic scholar in this analysis is Nietzsche (1882/1974). The Cartesian
obsession with calculation and mathematical objectivity gave rise to the realization
of what Nietzsche called perspectivism, which is the inescapable fact that any and
all consciousnesses exist in space and time; that consciousness is fundamentally
constituted of cultural, linguistic, and historical dimensions. Each knowing subject
is situated, and this is itself a universal fact.
What Bernstein calls the naı ¨ve notion of ‘‘objectivity’’ is what Husserl (1913/
1982) called the thesis of the natural attitude, which is the untested belief that there
exists some sort of permanent, ahistorical truth, or knowledge framework in the
world ‘‘out there’’ (Rorty 1998). Another focus of this paper, then, is the analysis of
the subjectivity of one type of knowledge: scientiﬁc knowledge. Scientiﬁc
knowledge cannot be entirely objective because it only represents the intersubjec-
tive agreement of a community of scholars. It is created through ‘‘interpretation.’’ Its
postulates, methods, and conclusions are constantly open to the critical scrutiny by
the scientiﬁc community. There is no method that can see and measure everything
because each phenomenon has what Husserl calls a different ontological structure.
Finally, this paper lays foundations for more research on the explanation of the role
of subjectivity in science and absolutism.
2 Subjectivity and relativism according to Bernstein
In Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (1983),
Bernstein tries to widen the context of subjectivity and claims that modern
discussions on the foundations of science and human action must consider thinkers
such as Gadamer and Habermas, who put forward the idea that one cannot reach
absolute truth because truth is subjective. Subjectivity is essentially self-awareness
or self-consciousness. This statement is clearly illustrated by Bernstein’s challenge
of the existence of ‘‘a ﬁrm foundation, an ontological grounding, a ﬁxed categorial
schemes’’ (1983:9). Consequently, all scientiﬁc methods that are used can never be
‘‘ﬂawless.’’
This modern idea of subjectivity originated with Descartes (Judowitz 1988). As
discussed by Bernstein, the Cartesian tradition implies self-awareness, the idea that
the human being is aware of his or her inner representations and that his or her mind
infers the existence of a thinking subject from such awareness. Subjectivity, thus, is
a direct result of the mind’s ability to be aware of its own representations. This is
particularly true in the social sciences, in which research is often criticized as being
‘‘subjective’’ and, thus, as not having much validity as research in the ‘‘hard’’
sciences. Subjectivity must mean that there are misrepresentations in the ‘‘reality’’
depicted by that knowledge. Those misrepresentations would be a function of the
individual perspectives and value systems of the scientist. We go beyond
objectivism, which makes Bernstein’s conception of ‘‘praxis’’ (that is, the process
by which something, i.e., a theory, becomes part of our lived experience) move
toward the avoidance of both foundationalism and nihilism. Bernstein cannot accept
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knowledge is based, partly, on the readings of Hegel (1807/1977).
According to Husserl (1900/1970), subjectivism is an ideology, a metaphysic that
it is ontologically equal to objectivism. They are both isms as such. When he talks
about subjectivity, he means the categorical phenomenon that is presumed for all
experience ‘‘subjective’’ or ‘‘objective.’’ It is confusing. Many have complained
about his choice of the word subjective with regard to transcendental subjectivity,
but there it is. Perhaps, ‘‘awareness’’ would have been better. We are aware of both
subjectivity and objectivity, and, at the level of pure awareness, they are equal
metaphysically and ontologically. Objectivity is a phenomenon just like subjectivity
and it has no priority or privilege. Bernstein confuses transcendental subjectivity
with mundane subjectivity.
This is a huge mistake by Bernstein. Husserl (1913/1982) is not a relativist at
all. Husserl is saying that we all have a pure awareness (pure meaning prior to
metaphysical judgments) and that, from this level of pure awareness, we
experience both attitudes (objectivist and subjectivist) and that they have different
meanings. As attitudes, they are identical. They are metaphysical prejudices that
need to be bracketed so we can study phenomena without bias—be they logic,
dreams, hunches, rocks, equations, or molecules. Some, we might protest, are not
‘‘real’’ objects like dreams and equations, but Husserl brackets this sort of
metaphysics as the naı ¨ve natural attitude (read as ‘‘objectivism’’). From this
vantage point, subjectivity and objectivity are both metaphysical judgments and
ideologies and they both arise together. We are aware of them in the same way—
transcendental awareness. Once we bracket the metaphysical judgment, then we
can step back, as it were and see them both for what they are: ideologies,
perspectives, and judgments and then we can see them as identical. There are two
sides of the same coin.
What is objectivism? It is an ism. What is subjectivism? It too is an ism. They are
phenomena that share qualities, the qualities of being not things but ideologies. We
can identify when and where they became important—the enlightenment, in parts of
Western Europe. This obsession with metaphysical judgment turns out to not be
shared by hardly any other culture. For magic peoples, for instance, spirits and
dreams may be more real, more signiﬁcant, than rocks and wood. So, this
ideological conﬂict between subjectivity and objectivity turns out to be very
ethnocentric, very much a child of the European enlightenment. This is why
Gadamer (1989) turns against what he calls the enlightenment prejudice against
prejudice as irrational. We cannot escape limitations.
Husserl (1900/1970) invented the method of phenomenological reduction and
bracketing to avoid the absurdity of objectivists and material scientists denying the
existence of mathematics and science. Science is not an object with bumps and
polka dots. By bracketing metaphysical judgment, Husserl enables us to validly
investigate all phenomena without prejudice, be they math (as in his own case) or
rocks. Husserl also went on to establish the necessary conditions for objectivity:
intersubjective agreement. Here, Husserl is speaking of subjectivity in its mundane
sense, not as transcendental awareness. However, from the vantage of
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communicating mundane subjects and how they do it.
We must investigate the necessary conditions for agreeing. Husserl says, it is
transcendental linguisticality; that is, the human capacity for language, which is not
limited to any one mundane subject and to synchronize through the process of
convention on a code that enables meaning to be generated and shared. What
enables this process of convention is communication itself and the rules of
convening. Here, we are brushing up against Noam Chomsky and Martin
Heidegger. Hence, the linguistic turn as the basis for explaining all phenomena
which are public—and maybe even private insofar as we think and feel in words a `
la Isocrates, Sapir, and Whorf.
There is growing evidence that these scholars were right, that the physical brain
is a sociocommunicative product and that the brain changes its physical structure as
it acquires language, and that these neuronets constitute a speciﬁcally linguistic
consciousness. That language here is not merely words and grammar but what
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) suggested in his Phenomenology of Perception
and Nietzsche even earlier: much more of the bandwidth of social interaction
through touch, taste, and smell. In this respect, one can think of Small and Vorgan’s
(2008) iBrain, Ledoux’s (2002) synaptic self, Schwartz and Begley’s (2003)
neuroplasticity, Doidge’s (2007) brain that changes itself, Lakoff and Nun ˜ez’s
(2001) origins of mathematics, and Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) philosophy in the
ﬂesh. Nietzsche (1882/1974) realizes that consciousness and language go hand in
hand but that there is more to the story:
The development of language and the development of consciousness (not of
reason but merely of the way reason enters consciousness) go hand in hand…
[this is] the need to communicate [ideas] to others by means of signs. The
human being inventing signs is at the same time the human being who
becomes ever more keenly conscious of himself. It was only as a social animal
that man acquired self-consciousness—which he is still in the process of
doing, more and more… consciousness does not really belong to man’s
individual existence but rather to his social or herd nature. (354)
Here, Nietzsche originates a new way of thinking; he recognizes at once both the
essential nature (the necessary condition for) consciousness as we know it—as
linguisticality of Dasein (as Heidegger put it). Yet, Nietzsche also realizes that this
is merely self-consciousness and that this involves the emergence of ego. As
dimensions accrue, dissociation increases, which means that the ego slowly emerges
from oceanic consciousness (to borrow from Freud) into collectivism toward
increasing individualism. In the process, we talk more and more; idea’s thinking
becomes valorized more and more. The enlightenment is the age of ideology and
modern ego. Bernstein (1990), Giles (1972), and Hall (1966) note how the more
individualistic a culture, the more people in that culture talk—and the more verbal
they become (i.e., elaborated code).
Nietzsche (1882/1974) notes in this short little passage, so jammed with insight,
that a key objective of language, communication, and evermore precise language is
a product of the desire for command—to give orders to others and for ordination in
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from publishing—words, words, words, from magic incantation to mental–rational
formulation. More fragmentation leads to the power of precision—to impose one’s
will. So, we divide everything into more and more words, smaller measures (hours,
minutes, and seconds; less tolerance in machining the world), and specialized
vocabularies. In this manner, we can better conceptualize, categorize, and
comprehend.
3 The limitations of knowledge: intersubjective agreement, not objectivity
Objectivity is the belief that there exists some sort of permanent, ahistorical
truth, or knowledge framework. As Michael Crotty (1998) deﬁnes it,
Objectivity is the epistemological view that things exist as meaningful
entities independently of consciousness and experience, that they have truth
residing in them as objects (‘‘objective’’ truth and meaning, therefore), and
that careful (scientiﬁc?) research can attain that objective truth and
meaning. (5)
Truth only exists in and out of our engagement with the realities in our world.
Bernstein follows the lead of Gadamer when he claims that it is naı ¨ve to talk
about a purely objective point of view. Objectivity is an untenable form of
rationality. Now we understand it. Meaning cannot be objective because there is
no meaning without a mind (Crotty 1998). Kant (1785/1981) argues that reality
as we know it depends on the cognitive functioning of the human mind. Society
determines what is true and false, right and wrong. This is the essence of Kant’s
social primacy of consciousness in metaphysics. What we think is true is a
collective delusion from which no one can escape. Since the ideas of Kant,
‘‘objectivity’’ has generally been thought to mean collective subjectivism. There
is no Truth. Søren Kierkegaard (1997) said that truth is subjectivity. It is then
impossible to discuss, argue, or judge any one group’s truth as more accurate or
less correct than any other’s. With no possibility to reason among the groups, the
only alternatives are either ethnocentrism or intergroup comparison (e.g., social
identity theory) through which political power is misused and abused to bash
cultural differences.
The existence of a world without human minds is conceivable; yet, meaning
without human minds is inconceivable (Guba and Lincoln 1994). Meaning stems
from intersubjective agreement or intersubjective conceptions of objectivity
(Gauker 1995). Habermas attacks the commonly held belief that knowledge is
limited to empirically testable propositions reached through disinterested, value-
free inquiry, a notion that lies at the core of both positivism and objectivist
rhetoric. Since people engage in consensual communication in order to achieve
intersubjective agreement, they should not try to win an argument at any cost,
but, instead, should listen to the other participants. As Habermas (1979) says, the
goal of communication is to reach agreement.
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As Gadamer (1989) realized the derogation of the ‘‘common sense’’ by the
enlightenment philosophers is unwarranted. Cultures and subcultures, such as
groups of astronomers, presume a conventional set of interests and presupposi-
tions which form the basis of the patterns they ‘‘discover.’’ As Nietzsche (1882/
1974) pointed out, what is often called knowledge is really only that which is
familiar to us personally, and after all, all direct observation, the basis of
empirical data, is at origin, personal. Nietzsche identiﬁed the origin of the motive
for knowledge in the desire for power and in our most fundamental fear of the
unknown:
What do they want when they want ‘knowledge’? Nothing more than this:
something strange is to be reduced to something familiar… what is familiar
means what we are used to so that we no longer marvel at it… something that
no longer disturbs us. Is not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is
the jubilation of those who attain knowledge not the jubilation over the
restoration of a sense of security? (300)
Here, Nietzsche is anticipating by nearly a century the idea that for the modern
human who no longer thrives on mysteries, the unknown generates anxiety which
can only be allayed by making the unknown known. This is done through
communication with the world, be it in what moderns call a methodical fashion or in
a less managed way. In the end, it is about self-efﬁcacy and power. Science, with its
practical expression as technology, is hardly objective unless one counts the will to
power, the will to confront and control natural forces, a mission without desire, will,
direction, or purpose—in a word, human, all too human motivation. Again,
Nietzsche (1882/1974) is instructive:
Do you really believe that the sciences would ever have originated and grown
if the way had not been prepared by magicians, alchemists, astrologers, and
witches whose promises and pretensions ﬁrst had to create a thirst, a hunger, a
taste for hidden and forbidden powers? (240)
Science insists upon questioning not only the subjects or events that we ﬁnd in
the world, but also our knowledge about the way the world is, and the way we come
to know things about it. Science works because no knowledge is ever taken as being
ﬁnal. Rather, it is created through ‘‘interpretation’’ and is always ideational and
provisional. It ‘‘is just a particular form of constructed knowledge designed to serve
particular purposes’’ (Crotty 1998:16). Any method in the social sciences is limited
in that it cannot deal with the unique, especially when it comes to analyzing human
behavior. A scientiﬁc method attempts to ﬁnd a pattern among things that are
timeless, universal, dependable, and replicable. In fact, what is crucial to scientiﬁc
method is experimental repeatability or reproducibility (Moore 1973). Yet, things
that are unique or that do not fall into these categories are outside the realm of
science. As Weisz (1965) puts it, ‘‘one-time events on earth are outside of science’’
(4). Moore (1973) adds that,
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(the arts, philosophy, and theology) is that science is self-testing and self-
correcting. The testing and correcting are done by means of observations that
can be repeated with essentially the same results by normal persons operating
by the same methods and with the same approach. (23)
Giving another example, statistics cannot be applied to individual cases. It is a
heuristic model designed with a view to ensuring that the results have certain
preconceived properties. Therefore, the statistical model, and any scientiﬁc
method, is preconceived, prejudiced, and biased, because it is humanly made. Plus,
going back to the idea of repeatability, replication also has to do with claims to
objectivity based on intersubjective agreement. There are well known epistemo-
logical problems with this. Equally important, despite a large number of
observations and a large number of cases showing consistency generated through
a method, it can never be guaranteed that the next event would not be contrary to
it. Henceforth, repeated observation cannot ultimately explain induction. For
example, no matter how many white swans we may have seen in our lifetime, it
does not imply that all swans are white; the next that we see may be black (Popper
1992).
Finally, subjectivity may emerge when the variables measured are intangible.
Intangible variables are variables that ‘‘are based on observations but that cannot be
observed directly or indirectly’’ (Babbie 2001:121). These variables are known as
constructs (Kaplan 1964). While constructs cannot be measured directly, there may
be some questions about them being real, in the sense that they are directly
observable and are constructed from measurements of other variables. They can be
considered valid because, although not real or observable in themselves, ‘‘they have
a deﬁnite relationship to things that are real and observable’’ (Babbie 2001:122).
A scientiﬁc method does not immunize us from ourselves, but, instead, it
institutionalizes our prejudices. After all, a method is always designed by
someone. There is no method that can see and measure everything because each
phenomenon has what Husserl calls a different ontological structure. Ontology is
the study of being; it is concerned with ‘‘what is’’ and the structure of reality as
such (Crotty 1998). In other words, their mode of being varies. The structure
(called sinn in German) of meaning cannot be entirely taken by reﬂecting on the
contexts within which meanings appear. They have to be understood in the
structure of the being. Ontological structure is important in the social sciences
because the human being is, ontologically, a ‘‘being there.’’ As such, he or she is
not merely a being like all the other beings in the world, but a being that has a
relation with his or her own being. Bernstein (1983) states that Husserl’s
explication of the ontological structure of the world leads us to transcendental
intersubjectivity. Transcendental intersubjectivity enables comparison among
things. As Husserl (1900/1970) explains it,
within the vitally ﬂowing intentionality in which the life of an ego-subject
consists, every other ego is intentionally implied, ‘‘implied’’ of course not as
real particular persons in the ﬂesh but as others in general, that is, as a
‘‘transcendental intersubjectivity.’’ (255)
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intersubjective agreement. In order to reach that agreement, a language game is
needed because, as Wittgenstein (1965) puts it, language does not only describe
events but also creates a cosmology, a view of the world that inﬂuences the thought,
behavior, and perception of humankind. We speak about our observation of the
world, more so than about the world itself (Baker 1991). Method is merely a
language game. We do this through a language game. Edward Sapir (quoted in
Whorf 1962) corroborates the argument in favor of the importance of language in
scientiﬁc method. He puts forward the idea that humans do not live in the objective
world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as we know it. On the contrary,
humans are deeply at the mercy of their particular language, the medium of
expression of their society. Sapir thinks it is naı ¨ve to believe that one can adjust to
reality essentially without language and that language is just a subordinate means of
solving speciﬁc problems of communication or reﬂection.
5 Final notes on objectivism versus subjectivism
We might suggest the application of Bakhtin’s (1930/1981) notion of chronotope, a
spatiotemporal complex that characterizes every genre of writing, to all human
experience. Originally, the concept was borrowed from Einstein’s work on relativity
and applied to biology. Then, Bahktin applied it to novels, and we now can
recognize its affectivity for all human experience. The explosion of Cartesianism
(metaphysical duality) comes with the realization that it is an ‘‘objective’’ fact that
observation is always from a particular perspective. This is living the aporia of
human existence, which Kramer (1997) calls ‘‘relative relativism,’’ that is, the
development of a typology of different worldviews based on the work of Jean
Gebser (1985) that would limit absolute relativism and enhance our ability to speak
meaningfully of generalizable difference across cultures and civilizations. Like a
double negative, relative relativism limits interpretations for practical purposes. The
motive for this move is that the realization that absolute relativism is the ultimate
threat to praxis.
Absolute objectivity is a child of the age of ideology, a version of utopian
thinking born of the positivistic movement in France during the eighteenth century.
It is, ultimately, naively optimistic. Why naı ¨ve? Nietzsche demonstrates that
perspectivism, the objective fact of perspectivism, is not negativism, if one
associates negativism with nihilism. Nietzsche argues that, quite the contrary,
positivism, with its demand that only my perspective is real and no other
alternatives can or should be considered, is nihilistic. Because positivism demanded
absolute epistemic domination for its one true version of reality, Nietzsche (1882/
1974) responds, ‘‘A ‘scientiﬁc’ interpretation of the world, as you understand it,
might therefore still be one of the most stupid of all possible interpretations of the
world, meaning that it would be one of the poorest in meaning’’ (p. 335). Notice
here that Nietzsche is explicitly stating that a scientiﬁc or objectivist picture of the
world is merely one interpretation among an inﬁnite number of possible
interpretations and that it is among the most impoverished because science, as a
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in short, the very deﬁnition of prejudice.
Thus, it is not a matter of subjectivity versus objectivity. Rather, the deeper issue
is one of pluralism, so dear to Nietzsche, and later Bahktin. Derrida (1981) refers to
pluralism as polyphony, the proliferation of voices that are not merely the
possibility of difference but also the essential necessity of it along with endless
dissemination for meaning to exist at all. Identity requires difference. The logical
structure of positivistic objectivist absolutism requires not merely the marginali-
zation of different voices. With its narrow absolutist formalism, positivism demands
that there can be only one true picture of reality, only one best solution for each
problem. Tolerance of the subaltern or alternative perspective is not tolerated.
A necessary condition for the privileging of a single point of view requires the
implication of alternative points of view. Objectivity arises only with the realization
of subjectivity. Beyond this semiotic fact, the valuation of one perspective over
another need not be made permanent. Different perspectives shift in ‘‘importance’’
depending on historical and personal interest. Beginning around the year 1200 AD
with the emergent humanist movement when people needed a new secular hero,
Aristotle was rehabilitated. The elevation of a piece of information to the status of a
relevant fact depends on the goal, need, or interest of the attendant observer.
The possibility of multiple interpretations informing and enriching each other,
what Bakhtin (1930/1981) calls the dialogic of heteroglossia, occurs all the time.
That is the fundamental synergy of lived experience. Yet, for dialogic to occur,
more than one perspective must be allowed. Bahktin, like Nietzsche, dares to reduce
science to just another form of literature, a move that enrages those who seek
absolute privilege. Heteroglossia, the reading of several different texts in the light of
each other, is done all the time by readers of all genre including of course historians.
For instance, a description of World War I from the point of view of a homeless
orphan may be dramatically different from a description of ‘‘the same’’ historical
event from the point of view of a military general, but it is no less ‘‘true.’’ Reading
them side-by-side changes the meaning of each one. The essence of deconstruction
is a tactical discursive move to place at the center of narrative a different point of
view. Positivism claims that there is only one true picture of reality thus negating
the possibility of dialogue between them. The fact that awards are given in science
speaks to its cultural bias for competition and the absolute elimination of ‘‘false’’
pictures of reality.
Positivism presumes not only the possibility but also the necessity of stating
issues in such a way that falsiﬁability will be assured. This is premised on a cultural
value, namely efﬁciency. This penchant for establishing the truth, once and for all,
with solution and resolution being ﬁnalized, emerged along with industrialization.
In the cultural frame of temporal anxiety and the chronic sense of urgency that
industrial capitalism spawns, for proﬁt is realized with each unit moved which
behooves the proﬁteer to move as fast as possible, entertaining different
perspectives that can give rise to what Roland Barthes calls the ecstasy of reading
is simply and unacceptably inefﬁcient. Reading is process oriented. It is thinking.
The modern industrial world is goal oriented and demands production which is units
produced per unit of time.
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Fascist societies. In such a world, a thing or idea has value only insofar as it can be
exploited. Value is a judgment which makes evaluation a subjective process based
hopefully (in the interest of justice) on conventional criteria. If a forest cannot be
timbered or a river harnessed for generating power, providing water, or ﬁshed, then
it has no value. It may look pretty but esthetics are mere subjective opinion.
However, notice that the objective measure of value in the modern world of positive
industrialization, for remember that August Comte and Saint-Simon promoted
positivism as the new religion of a speciﬁcally industrial world, is ultimately
hypertrophic subjectivity. What is valuable in a cost/beneﬁt world is what I
personally can exploit or turn to my personal advantage. Rationality itself is reduced
to subjective interests in the formulation of cost/beneﬁt calculus. Given what one’s
desire or goal is, then there is a most efﬁcient, most rational path of action. So long
as ethics and morality are deemed irrelevant, then ‘‘the given’’ cannot be assessed—
only the path of securing the goal can be measured.
Within historical perspective, which ironically is missing in Bernstein, is the
cause of the rise of the emergent split between the subject and the object. It
coincides with the emergent sense of spatial thinking and the emerging modern ego
(Gebser 1985; Kramer 1997). What is valued as objective truth, is what I want and
agree with. Bernstein touches on this as he follows Husserl’s (1913/1982) analysis
of intersubjectivity in his Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a
Phenomenological Philosophy, where Husserl picks up on Nietzsche’s revolution-
ary claim that human consciousness as we know it is a product of the need to
communicate and is thus an intersubjective phenomenon supported by language
(hence, Heidegger’s notion of the linguisticality of Dasein). Nietzsche (1882/1974)
puts it this way:
I may now proceed to the surmise that consciousness has developed only
under the pressure of the need for communication; that from the start it was
needed and usefully only between human beings; and that it also developed
only in proportion to the degree of this utility. Consciousness is really only a
net of communication between human beings. (298)
Here, Nietzsche is picking up where Isocrates left off and initiating the new
linguistic turn in the social sciences so prevalent in many scholars, including
Ferdinand de Saussure, Edward Sapir, Benjamin Whorf, Martin Heidegger, Ludwig
Wittgenstein, Paul Ricoeur, George Lakoff, Jacques Derrida, and so many others.
Nietzsche explodes the Cartesian bifurcation of interior subjective knowledge and
exterior objective fact. What displaces this old linear notion of causal stimulus
acting upon a receptive yet passive psyche is the ﬁeld of intersubjectivity, which is
neither my personal property nor a natural physical object acting upon me.
6 Discussion
Bernstein misses important points. To be fair, he is right about knowledge and
science not being ‘‘absolute.’’ The mind’s ability to be aware of its own
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is some permanent, ahistorical truth, or knowledge framework—is thus false. No
single human being will be able to solve all the mysteries of the world through a
deﬁnite, heuristic, and universal methodology. As we have seen, culture shapes the
way we see things and provides us with a deﬁnite view of the world. Each culture
has its own reality, logic, truth and falsity, and right and wrong. It is all about
interpretation, perception, and subjectivity. Basing his argument on the Cartesian
tradition, Bernstein claims that subjectivity implies self-awareness, the idea that the
human being is aware of his or her inner representations and that his or her mind
infers the existence of a thinking subject from such awareness.
What Bernstein calls the immature notion of ‘‘objectivity’’ is what Husserl (1913/
1982) called the view of the natural attitude, which is the unproven belief that there
exists some sort of permanent, ahistorical truth, or knowledge framework in the
world ‘‘out there.’’ Nietzsche’s (1882/1974) thesis of perspectivism is the
unavoidable fact that any and all consciousnesses exist in space and time. Hence,
consciousness is essentially made of cultural, linguistic, and historical dimensions.
Each knowing subject is situated, and this is itself a universal fact. For Nietzsche, as
it was (later) for Derrida (1981), a scientiﬁc or objectivist picture of the world is
only one interpretation among an inﬁnite number of possible interpretations.
The scientiﬁc method seems like a powerful tool of knowledge, but it has
limitations to its applicability and certainty. The claim that scientiﬁc knowledge is
absolute does not take other important avenues of human endeavor into account, as
well as other ways of discovering knowledge and truth. It also wrongly applies the
scientiﬁc method which, as great as it is, was never meant to be a cure-all. As it has
been described in detail, a scientiﬁc method can never be ‘‘ﬂawless’’ because it is
designed by humans; it is limited to the present; and it is heuristic and does not deal
with the unique. In line with these contentions, not only can repeated observation
not ultimately explain induction but also subjectivity may emerge when the
variables being measured are intangible. More importantly, there is no method that
can see and measure everything because each phenomenon has what Husserl calls a
different ontological structure.
The dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity causes a stir in science,
especially the social sciences, as disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, and
communication attempt to deﬁne an appropriate method, whether it is modeled after
a conventional scientiﬁc method or something new. We adopt the postmodern view
that there well may be an objective reality out there, but au fond, we know that it is
our subjective interpretations of it. The issue is not the existence of objective reality.
What is problematic is the lack of agreement on whether or not our subjective
perceptions correspond with the external world.
Since methods—and, along with them, the data they generate—belong to the
realm of subjectivity, then criticism, oftentimes directed to the social sciences,
should not be limited to them only but also, and no less, to other sciences too. For
future research, investigators should also concentrate more on criticism by
emphasizing its weaknesses, by making research assumptions clearer and more
delineated, and by showing the utility of important constructs in predicting and
understanding other important variables. As Bernstein (1983) claims, there is no
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(111). Given this, there should be signiﬁcant discussion about what the criteria
should be and how they should be applied. On the same matter of subjectivity, other
issues should be addressed for future investigation: ‘‘Is subjectivity really the
extreme end of relativism?’’ ‘‘Does subjectivity simply mean ‘non-objectivity’ or
does it also come in various shapes and sizes?’’ or ‘‘Can there be a difference
between social subjectivity and individual subjectivity?’’
Finally, further research should be conducted on the very notion of absolutism.
We know that subjectivists are opposed to it, but the word ‘‘absolutism’’ itself never
claims that we possess absolute knowledge. Absolutism is just the doctrine that
there is only ‘‘one truth out there.’’ The very idea of absolute knowledge, made
notorious by the philosophers of the enlightenment, has made us change our minds
about the a priori meaning of absolutism. Investigators should also concentrate more
on the self-vis-a `-vis absolutism. To a question such as ‘‘Can there be a self-
contained, individuated self who knows the one truth?’’ (Masterpasqua and Perna
1997), multiple answers are expected to mushroom in future literary circles of the
social sciences.
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